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To INFINITY AND BEYOND: THE PROBLEM OF OPEN-ENDED
PRODUCT CLAIM LANGUAGE IN THE UNPREDICTABLE ARTS
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Mary has invented a new process for making carbon fibers. Not
only is her process cheaper and more efficient than previously known processes, but
it also produces fibers of superior tensile strength. In fact, Mary's fibers exhibit
much higher tensile strength than any fibers made before, with her most successful
experiments yielding a tensile strength of X. The highest tensile strength previously
achieved was Y some value less than X.
Excited about her breakthrough and aware of its commercial implications,
Mary immediately calls her patent attorney, Kris, and asks him to draft a patent
application. As competent counsel, Kris recognizes that Mary can potentially claim
both the process and the resulting fiber. He begins drafting right away, and two
days later the specifications and claims are complete. The first three claims cover
Mary's new process. Claim 4 reads, "A carbon fiber having a tensile strength of X
or more." Kris carefully selects this open-ended' language to maximize the scope
of Mary's patent protection.2 Though Kris knows that Mary has not yet achieved
tensile strengths greater than X, Mary told him that she suspects her new method
could obtain higher tensile strengths. Kris wants to make sure the patent also covers
those superior fibers. Besides, Kris has seen similar claim language in other
chemistry-related patents.3 Satisfied by his effort, Kris sends the application to the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
1. In this Comment, an "open-ended" claim is one written such that it has no boundary on one
end. For example, the literal language of Mary's hypothetical Claim 4 captures any fiber with a tensile
strength between X (marking a lower boundary) and infinity (marking the absence of an upper
boundary). Where the open-ended language refers to aproperty of a claimed material, as here, patentees
frequently use phrases such as "at least X," "X or more," more than X," or "greater than X."
2. Kris also knows that this claim will not read on the prior art because the highest tensile strength
previously achieved was Y-some value less than X.
3. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,247,372 col.22 11.30-34 (filed Apr. 4, 2003) (claiming a
"polyethylene filament having a tensile strength of 15 cN/dtex or more and a tensile modulus of 500
cN/dtex or more, wherein an index value of a Circular knit comprising the filament is 3.0 or more as
determined by using a coup tester" (emphasis added)); U.S. Patent No. 7,214,428 col.2211.55-62 (filed
Apr. 9, 2003) (claiming a "coated nanocrystal comprising: a core comprising a first semiconductor
material, a shell layer deposited on the core comprising a second semiconductor material, a coating
material deposited on said shell layer comprised of an imidazole-based composition wherein said coated
nanocrystal has a quantum yield of greater than 30% when excited with light" (emphasis added)): U.S.
Patent No. 5,281,477 col. 10 11.41-45 (filed Apr. 9, 1991) (claiming a "carbon fiber of a high tenacity
and a high modulus of elasticity which has a fiber diameter of 1 6 microns, a strand tenacity of 503
kg/mm or more, a strand modulus of elasticity of 28 ton/rmV or more and a density of 1.773 g/cm3 or
more" (emphasis added)); U.S. Patent No. 5,087,710 col.9 1.64 to-col.10 1.5 (filed Jan. 4, 1990)
(claiming a "homogeneous rhenium metathesis catalyst, comprising a rhenium (VII) atom centrally
linked to an alkylidene ligand, an alkylidyne ligand, and two other ligands of which at least one ligand
is an electron withdrawing ligand in which its corresponding free ligand in protinated form has a pKa
below about 9; wherein the catalyst has significant metathesis activity that can effect the metathesis of
an ordinary or functionalized olefin at room temperature at a rate of at least one turnover per hour"
(emphasis added)).
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About a year later, the examination process begins when junior examiner
Alfonso finally takes a look at Mary's application. Alfonso is smart. He earned a
Bachelor of Science in chemistry from a prestigious state university, graduating
with honors. He then worked for a start-up company for three years as a chemist
before moving to the PTO, where he has been for seven months.4 Alfonso is also
pressed for time. Typically, he has only eight hours to devote to each application
5
over the course of 2.6 years-the average time an application spends in
prosecution.6 Scanning Mary's specification and claims, Alfonso immediately
notices the open-ended language in Claim 4. He asks himself if Mary really has
made such an amazing breakthrough in carbon fiber synthesis that her new process
can achieve fibers having unlimited tensile strength.' Skeptical, Alfonso consults
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) and finds section 2164.08,
titled "Enablement Commensurate in Scope with the Claims."8 Regarding scope of
enablement, section 2164.08 suggests a two-part inquiry: the examiner must (1)
"determine how broad the claim is with respect to the disclosure" and (2) determine
if a person having ordinary skill in the art is able to practice the full scope of the
invention without undue experimentation.9 Hoping for additional guidance, Alfonso
carefully reads section 2164.08 several more times but remains uncertain about
whether the MPEP requires or even presents a special framework for evaluating
open-ended product claims. Should he allow Claim 4, and how should he decide?
This Comment explains why the MPEP guideline offers little help to an
examiner faced with Alfonso's predicament and suggests that a change to the
guideline may be in order. In short, the difficulty arises from two sources. First,
claim construction principles demand that open-ended terms in product claims be
given their plain meaning in virtually all cases. 10 As a result, the scope of "open-
ended product claims" will typically be quite broad. In this Comment, open-ended
product claims are those like Mary's hypothetical Claim 4, in which (1) the open-
ended language refers to one or more properties of a claimed product, (2) the
novelty and value of the product substantially depend upon the magnitudes of the
relevant properties, and (3) the underlying art is "unpredictable." This Comment
4. A person with Alfonso's qualifications would likely be hired at the GS-9 grade level. See
USAJOBS, Patent Examiner (Chemistry), Qualifications Required, http://jobsearch.usajobs.opm.gov/
getjob.asp?JoblD-62664828&TabNum-3&rc-2 (last visited Dec. 7,2007). The lowest examiner grade
level is GS-5. See id. The GS-5 level requires candidates to meet relatively minimal "basic
qualifications." See id. To be a patent examiner, a candidate must "[h]ave at least a bachelor's degree
in physical sciences, life sciences, or engineering that included 30 semester hours in chemistry,
supplemented by course work in mathematics through differential and integral calculus, and at least 6
semester hours of physics." Id. Alternatively, a candidate without even a bachelor's degree could be
hired if he possessed an appropriate "combination of education and experience" in chemistry. See id.
5. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 135 n.128 (2002) ("[Eight hours] is an average across all industries, and
thus there may be substantial variation in the hours spent from one industry to another.").
6. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2006, at 120 tbl.1 (2006), available at http://uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/
2006annualreport.pdf.
7. Alfonso realizes that Claim 4 does not read on the prior art.
8. U.S. PATENT& TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.08
(8th ed., 6th rev. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP].
9. Id.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
[Vol. 59: 865
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assumes that patents including one or more open-ended product claims also include
at least one corresponding process claim, where the new process is what has
enabled achievement of the superior product."
Second, available scope of enablement tests, including the one found in section
2164.08, essentially do nothing more than restate the basic enablement inquiry.
12
This basic inquiry is highly fact-specific and leaves a great deal of discretion in the
hands of a factfinder. 3 While such a result might be acceptable for most types of
claims, this Comment contends that where open-ended product claims are
concerned, the patent examiner ought to take a different approach. 4 The
exceptional breadth of open-ended product claims weakens the patent system's
presumption that patent examiners are competent toj udge whether broad claims are
truly enabled. 5 Moreover, prudent policy suggests in this context that the PTO err
on the side of allowing narrower claims rather than broader ones. 6 Therefore, as an
alternative to the current MPEP approach for open-ended product claims, this
Comment suggests that patent examiners should presumptively reject open-ended
product claims in the unpredictable arts, allowing only those claims that are limited
by the highest values actually achieved by the patentee and disclosed in the
specification.
This Comment's proposed approach is preferable to the current MPEP
guideline for at least two reasons. First, in the particular context of open-ended
product claims in the unpredictable arts, the patent examiner is not well-equipped
to undertake such a difficult and fact-specific inquiry; not even the inventor will
know for certain what her method can in fact achieve through subsequent
experimentation.' Given that the examiner will have very little time to devote to
the application, this concern is especially relevant. 8 Second, erring on the side of
11. This Comment assumes that products with relevant properties of higher magnitudes are
"superior" products.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
13. See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REv.
(forthcoming Autumn 2008) (manuscript at 30 n.143), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstract id-I 103968 ("[W]hether a given disclosure... is enabling within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 112, must be decided by a rule of reason applied to the facts of the case." (quoting In re
Metcalfe, 410 F.2d 1378, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); discussion infra
Part IV.A (examining current tests for enablement).
14. At least one other commentator has suggested that broad claims in the unpredictable arts pose
unique difficulties. Professor Sean B. Seymore has contended that "the current patent examination
framework allows a patentee [in an unpredictable art] to obtain a broad claim encompassing millions
of compounds enabled by a trivial amount of supporting disclosure." Seymore, supra note 13
(manuscript at 4). Suggesting that allowance of such claims "can have a chilling effect on other
scientists who are trying to elucidate how to make and use the claimed invention while the inventor does
not know how to do so," Professor Seymore "propose[s] a new approach to the prima facie case of
nonenablement for patent applications in the unpredictable arts." Id. (manuscript at 5). Despite the
highly fact-specific nature of the enablement inquiry, Professor Seymore argues that the patent
examiner is "uniquely poised to derail nonenabled inventions," id. (manuscript at 30 31), and should
serve as "the gatekeeper of the patent system," id. (manuscript at 30).
15. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.1.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
18. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 5, at 135 n. 128. Further, this Comment argues that giving
examiners additional time and resources would not solve the problems presented by open-ended product
claims. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
20081
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allowing narrower claims-compared to allowing broader claims-better
encourages innovation over time.' 9
Further, this Comment's suggested approach does not punish an inventor
whose new process really does enable the full range of possible products-the
inventor'sprocess claims will protect her process, even though herproduct claims,
no longer open-ended, will not. For example, imagine that Mary's new process
really does enable scientists to produce carbon fibers having tensile strengths of
virtually infinite magnitude. An examiner following this Comment's suggested
approach would reject Mary's Claim 4, which claims a "carbon fiber having a
tensile strength of X or more," but would allow a claim omitting the words "or
more." However, such a rejection would not mean that Mary's competitors could
read Mary's patent and based on its teaching, brazenly make, use, and sell carbon
fibers having a tensile strength greater than X. Mary's competitors could not do so
because Mary's patent would still grant her a monopoly in her new fiber-making
process, which she also claims. Therefore, this Comment's suggested approach
does not rob inventors of the fruits of their labor in those instances (perhaps rare)
when the open-ended product claims truly are enabled. The accompanying process
claims will protect those extraordinary inventors. Rather, this Comment's suggested
approach will prevent all inventors from receiving unearned windfalls.
Part 11 of this Comment describes basic enablement principles. Part III argues
that claim construction principles in both litigation and prosecution contexts
demand that open-ended terms in product claims be given their plain meaning in
virtually all cases. Part IV reviews several currently accepted tests for determining
the scope of enablement, particularly as they relate to open-ended claims, and
concludes that all the tests leave enormous discretion in the hands of courts and
examiners. Part IV thus proposes that patent examiners should presumptively reject
open-ended product claims, allowing only those claims that are limited by the
highest values actually achieved by the patentee and disclosed in the specification.
Part V concludes by summarizing the arguments of this Comment.
19. See Seymore, supra note 13 (manuscript at 5) ("[U]ndue patent scope can have a chilling
effect on other scientists who are trying to elucidate how to make and use the claimed invention while
the inventor does not know how to do so."); discussion infra Part I V.B.2 (discussing the policy concerns
that arise from the allowance of open-ended product claims).
[Vol. 59: 865
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11. ENABLEMENT PRINCIPLES 20
Patents have often been described as monopolies granted by the government
in exchange for the patentee's disclosure of her invention. 2 In other words, an
inventor tells the world how to accomplish some new thing, and the government
gives the inventor the right to prevent others from doing that new thing for a set
amount of time.22 But the government will not give away such broad rights in
exchange for any new thing. Rather, the invention must satisfy the so-called
requirements of patentability: "(1) patentable subject matter, (2) novelty, (3) utility,
(4) nonobviousness, and (5) enablement. '2 3 Among these, "enablement"
particularly emphasizes the nature of the patent grant as a bargain with society. The
basic principles ofenablement are well known. To begin, an inventor must disclose
enough of her invention to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to
practice it.24 The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides,
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.
2 5
20. The reader may notice that this discussion employs both "patentability" and "infringement"
language. In the enablement analysis, the two contexts are nearly identical, and the following principles
apply equally during prosecution and after issue. See 35 U. S.C. § 282 (2000) (listing "failure to comply
with any requirement of [§] 112" as a defense "in any action involving the validity or infringement of
a patent"). In fact, under a § 112 enablement analysis, the only difference between unissued and issued
claims is the presumed validity of the latter. See Magnaflux Corp. v. Coe, 139 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir.
1943) ("In a suit to obtain a patent the presumption of administrative and judicial correctness runs
against the rejected claims, while in an infringement suit the presumption of administrative correctness
runs in favor of the issued patent."); Drexelbrook Controls, Inc. v. Magnetrol Int'l, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
397, 400 (D. Del. 1989) ("A patent is presumed valid, and each claim of a patent is presumed valid
independent of the validity of the other claims." (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282)), aff'd, 904 F.2d 45 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
21. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("[Patents are]
grant[s] of a statutory monopoly .... [and] are not given as favors .... but are meant to encourage
invention by rewarding the inventor .... (citations omitted)); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) ("[A] patent is an exception to the general rule against
monopolies .... "); Zachos v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 166 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1948) ("A patent is a
monopoly granted by the public and is of public interest .... ), aff'don reh 'g, 177 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.
1949); Am. Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 116, 117 (8th Cir. 1935) ("A patent is a
governmental grant of monopoly for the making, selling, and use of a novelty (disclosed therein) as
claimed by the patent.").
22. The Supreme Court emphasized the nature of the bargain in the following way: "[I]mmediate
disclosure is not the objective of, but is exactedfrom, the patentee. It is the price paid for the exclusivity
secured." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003).
23. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETERS. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 128 (rev. 4th ed. 2007).
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Further, "to be enabling, the specification of[a] patent must teach those skilled
in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
undue experimentation."26 In other words, the scope of enablement provided must
be "commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims"; stated
differently, "the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope
of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the
art."2 Importantly, enablement "must be judged as of [the application] filing
date."'2 9 In addition, whether a claim is enabled depends in part on the predictability
of the art: "Patents concerning chemical reactions . . . generally involve
unpredictable factors and thus enable a narrower range of claims [than patents
concerning more predictable arts]."3 °
Courts and the PTO have distinguished "scope" enablement from "general"
enablement.3 When the specification does not enable any subject matter within the
scope of the claim, a general enablement rejection is appropriate. 2 General
enablement rejections frequently arise when "there is reason to doubt the objective
truth of the statements [in the specification] which must be relied on for enabling
support."33 For example, such a rejection was appropriate where an inventor
claimed a "method of dwarfing sugar beets by cold shock" under conditions the
examiner believed would immediately freeze the plants "beyond revival." 4
26. Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo NordiskA/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
27. Inre Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
28. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
29. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (quoting In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232
(C.C.P.A. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1096, 1107-08 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (citing In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778,
786 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[C]hemical reactions [were] recognized by our predecessor court as having a
high degree of unpredictability and therefore requiring an increased enablement disclosure."); Fisher,
427 F.2d at 839 ("In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions.... the
scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors
involved.").
31. See In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); MPEP, supra note 8, at § 706.03(c),
7.31.02 .03. Though the MPEP does not have the force of law, it is entitled to judicial notice so far
as it is an official interpretation of statutes and regulations with which it is not in conflict. Refac Int'l,
Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.,
48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
32. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1356.
33. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223
(C.C.P.A. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. In re Pottier, 376 F.2d 328, 329-30 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The rejection in Pottier was nominally
a lack-of-utility rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 329. However, later courts have made clear that
"[i]f the written description fails to illuminate a credible utility," rejections under both § 112
(enablement) and § 101 (utility) are appropriate. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1356. The Cortright court noted,
"This dual rejection occurs because '[t]he how to use prong of [§] 112 incorporates as a matter of law
the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility
for the invention."' Id. (quoting In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (alteration in
original); see also I DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.04 n.2 (2007) (listing authorities for
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A claim can also be rejected for lack of "scope" enablement, or "undue
breadth," when the claim includes material to which the specification is not
enabling in addition to material to which the specification is enabling.35 Scope of
enablement rejections under § 112 "orbit about the more fundamental question: To
what scope of protection is this applicant's particular contribution to the art
entitled?"36 For example, an applicant whose invention increased hair growth by a
factor of three some "filling-in" and additional "fuzz" on the scalp of the
user-could not legitimately claim to "cure baldness" but could claim to "restore
hair growth."37
The Federal Circuit's predecessor court addressed the appropriate scope of
protection for broad or open-ended claims in the seminal opinion of In re Fisher.3"
There, inventor Joseph Fisher's patent application claimed an adrenocorticotrophic
hormone (ACTH) preparation "containing at least I International Unit of ACTH per
milligram," where the number of International Units of ACTH per milligram
(IU/mg) was a measure of the preparation's potency for treating arthritis and other
pathologies in humans. 9 Previous ACTH preparations could not effectively treat
humans, in part because their potencies were too low, reaching only about 0.5
IU/mg. 40 In contrast, the Fisher specification disclosed preparations having 1.11 to
2.30 IU/mg.4' It is unclear why Fisher chose not to include an upper limit in his
ACTH claim. Perhaps he believed his method could indeed produce preparations
of greater potencies than those he obtained in his experiments to date;42 or perhaps
he simply wished to claim for himself all future ACTH preparations suitable for
human patients. Regardless, Fisher's choice meant the court had to decide "whether
an inventor who is the first to achieve a potency of greater than 1.0 ... should be
allowed to dominate all such compositions having potencies greater than 1.0,
including future compositions having potencies far in excess of those obtainable
from his teachings plus ordinary skill.
43
To guide its analysis, the court enunciated two principles. First, "an inventor
should be allowed to dominate the future patentable inventions of others where
those inventions were based in some way on his teachings. 44 Second, however,
"[i]t is equally apparent.., that he must not be permitted to achieve this dominance
by claims which are insufficiently supported and hence not in compliance
with ... 35 U.S.C. § 1 12." 45 Two facts led the Fisher court to conclude that the
specification did not enable the inventor's open-ended claim: the invention related
35. See Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1356; MPEP, supra note 8, at § 706.03(c), 7.31.03.
36. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 06 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
37. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1357-59.
38. 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
39. Id. at 834 35. One IU/mg was considered equal to a potency of 1.0. Id. at 839.
40. Id. at 834.
41. Id. at 839.
42. In a separate, related patent, Fisher listed fourteen numbered examples of ACTH preparations
and indicated that other experiments had been carried out also. See Process for Preparing Adrenal Gland
Stimulating Substance, U.S. Patent No. 3,192,115 col. 4 11 (filed Jan. 30, 1957) (issued June 29, 1965).





Zimmer: To Infinity and beyond: The Problem of Open-Ended Product Claim L
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to an unpredictable art,46 and there was no "inherent upper limit" to the theoretically
possible potencies of compositions like those claimed.47
Ultimately, Fisher established several important principles and one test. The
principles include the following: (1) "[o]pen-ended claims are not inherently
improper";4" (2) the scope of claims must bear a "reasonable correlation" to the
scope of the specification;4 9 and (3) enablement is a "sliding scale": the more
unpredictable the art, the more explicit and detailed the specification must be.5 °
Fisher's sole test was more precisely articulated by the Federal Circuit over twenty
years later in Scripps: open-ended claims "may be supported if there is an inherent,
albeit not precisely known, upper limit and the specification enables one of skill in
the art to approach that limit.' 5 Notably, if a fear had existed that allowance of a
broad claim "might lead to enforcement efforts against ... later developers," after
Fisher that fear "is both irrelevant and unwarranted.,
52
Based on the foregoing, Fisher and its progeny undeniably establish that open-
ended claims can be appropriate, depending on whether or not they are enabled. But
such a conclusion merely begs the question as to how an applicant, patent examiner,
court, or market competitor can know whether an open-ended claim is in fact
enabled. Open-ended claims present a more difficult problem for practitioners than
bounded claims do because the former's language extends into infinity.53 No matter
how detailed the specification, it cannot disclose an infinite number of
embodiments. In other words, the unbounded claim language will always literally
include more than the specification explicitly discloses.5 4 For example, consider
46. See id. The court characterized the field of the invention as "physiological activity." Id.
Though this narrow classification may not constitute an entire "art" as some now conceive the term, see,
e.g., MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.03 (using the term art implicitly to refer to larger fields such as
chemistry, mechanical engineering, and electrical engineering), such differences in nomenclature are
irrelevant. Rather, it is important that the Fisher court recognized the unpredictable nature of the science
underlying the invention, grouping "physiological activity" with "most chemical reactions" in the
"unpredictable" category. Fisher, 427 F.3d at 839.
47. Id. at 839-40.
48. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The Scripps court continued, "[A]s for all claims[, the] appropriateness [ofopen-ended claims] depends
on the particular facts of the invention, the disclosure, and the prior art." Id.
49. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
1, 8 (2007).
50. Robert Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: TheAvailable
Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 103 (2006).
51. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1572.
52. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
53. While this proposition is generally true, not all open-ended claims necessarily extend into
infinity. Some are instead bounded by an inherent upper limit, such as 100%. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No.
7,132,559 col.5011.20-21 (filed Feb. 25, 2002) (claiming a chemical compound having an enantiomeric
excess of "greater than or equal to about 95%," where the maximum value for enantiomeric excess is
100%). Such claims, however, face the same enablement difficulties as truly infinite claims when the
specification does not disclose an example or embodiment reaching the upper limit, such as 100%,
which it rarely does.
54. The problem may be especially acute where the language concerns a material's properties,
as in this Comment's opening hypothetical. See Nikolas J. Uhlir, Note, Throwing a Wrench in the
System: Si e-Dependent Properties, Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B.J.
327, 338 (2007) (arguing that patentees' reliance on properties to protect their nanotechnology
inventions places a heavy burden on patent examiners). Uhlir, a former patent examiner, observes the
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U.S. Patent No. 5,087,710, which claims a "homogeneous rhenium metathesis
catalyst... ; wherein the catalyst has significant metathesis activity that can effect
the metathesis of an ordinary or functionalized olefin at room temperature at a rate
of at least one turnover per hour.''s, The specification provides three examples of
olefin metathesis reactions, with only one example of the three disclosing a catalyst
activity "at least 200.,,56 This claim language captures catalysts with an activity
of 200, just as it captures catalysts with an activity of 1, 100, 1000, 1 million, or 1
billion. Therefore, it can readily be seen that even if the specification listed three
hundred examples instead of three, and even if those three hundred examples all
disclosed different activities, ranging from 1 to 1 million, the claim language would
still literally include more than the specification explicitly discloses. This results
from the fact that the claim language literally captures an infinite number of
catalysts with a potentially infinite activity, including a catalyst with an activity of
1,000,001. Two dispositive issues thus emerge for any particular open-ended claim:
how broadly should it be construed and how does one test whether a broad claim
has been enabled? Parts III and IV will address these issues in turn.
111. OPEN-ENDED CLAIM INTERPRETATION
The MPEP provides relatively clear claim interpretation guidelines to
examiners like Alfonso.57 Before addressing the MPEP guidelines, however, this
Part will survey the ways open-ended product claims could be interpreted during
litigation. Litigation is addressed first because this Comment's ultimate suggestion
that examiners not allow open-ended product claims is based in part on avoiding
harms that are likely to occur if such claims appear in issued patents. 5' However,
it should be distinctly recognized that claim interpretation occurs in two different
contexts: prosecution and litigation. The prudent patentee will draft her claims with
an eye toward potential litigation-where an accused or potential infringer can
challenge the patent's validity.59 While patentees understandably want to draft their
claims as broadly as possible, overreaching can result in invalidity of the claims
following:
[P]roperty limitations are difficult to search for and locate in the prior art. Even
ifa property is well known, the chance that the prior art will disclose that property
in a context that is useful to the examiner (i.e., relevant and applicable to the
pending claims) is relatively small.
Id. at 339-40 (internal footnote omitted). An examiner considering an open-ended claim in Patent A
will recognize not only that he may not find relevant prior art during prosecution, but also that the next
examiner who considers a later application disclosing an improvement to the properties in Patent A will
likely not find Patent A's broad claim. Such a failure will be particularly troublesome because Patent
A may capture, but will not disclose, the properties of the later application.
55. U.S. Patent No. 5,087,710 col.9 1.64-col.10 1.5 (filed Jan. 4, 1990) (emphasis added).
Catalytic olefin, or alkene, metathesis occurs when a catalyst facilitates first the breaking oftwo carbon-
carbon double bonds and then the reformation of the two bonds, except with the bonding partners
switched. See ROBERT H. CRABTREE, THE ORGANOMETALLIC CHEMISTRY OF THE TRANSITION METALS
§ 11.4 (3d ed. 2001).
56. '710 Patent, at col.9 11.5 55.
57. See MPEP, supranote 8, at §§ 2111, 2111.01.
58. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.2.
59. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 53 (3d ed. 2002).
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entirely. Thus, it is in the best interest of patentees to draft claims as broadly as
possible without overreaching.6" Therefore, in addition to identifying the current
PTO claim interpretation standard, this Part seeks to accomplish two goals
regarding open-ended product claims: (1) help patentees choose appropriate
language-accurate, fair, and likely to survive judicial scrutiny-during
prosecution; and (2) help predict how open-ended product claims in issued patents
might be interpreted in litigation. This Part should be read with both contexts in
mind.
A. Litigation
In an issued patent, open-ended product claim language could conceivably be
interpreted in three ways. First, the open-ended language can be given its plain
meaning. Second, the language can be interpreted in accordance with a definition
the patentee set forth in the specification, taking on a particular and perhaps even
idiosyncratic meaning. Finally, the language can be given whatever meaning is
necessary to make the claim valid, which will usually result in a meaning narrower
than the plain meaning. This Part suggests that the first interpretation is most
common, the second interpretation presents pitfalls to the unwary patentee, and the
third interpretation should be universally rejected.
A fundamental principle of claim interpretation is that "claim construction
analysis must begin and remain centered on the claim language itself."' This
cardinal rule recognizes that "[c]laim construction.., is not.., policy-driven" but
instead is "a contextual interpretation of language. 62 Thus, it is implicitly assumed
that the patentee has chosen her words carefully.63 As a result, courts do not have
the option of enlarging or restricting the scope of the claims as written.64 Instead,
Courts must take the claims as they find them, shunning "a construction that flies
in the face of the express language of the claim. 65
A patentee may, however, act "as his own lexicographer," defining a term as
he chooses in his patent specification.66 If a patentee does not act as his own
lexicographer, the ordinary meaning of the term to one skilled in the art at the time
of invention controls.6 In turn, the ordinary meaning of a term to one skilled in the
art is based primarily on the patent specification, because that person is "deemed
to read the claim term . . . in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification."68 If, however, the meaning of a term is no different in the context of
the invention than in everyday, lay usage, there is no need for "elaborate
60. MERGES, MiENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 23, at 308 ("The trick in drafting patent claims...
is to make them as broad as the prior art and other patent doctrines will allow.").
61. InnovafPure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
62. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
63. See Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
64. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
65. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
66. Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
67. Id.
68. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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interpretation"69 and the "widely accepted meaning of commonly understood
words" applies.7" When more than one plain meaning exists, courts should adopt
the narrower meaning when "the narrower one is clearly supported by the intrinsic
evidence while the broader one raises questions of enablement under § 112."" This
rule arises from the patent applicant's burden to "distinctly" and "particularly"
identify the metes and bounds of her invention.72 If the patentee fails to use
language that unambiguously stakes out a broader claim, she will be limited to the
narrower interpretation of the language.73 However, because terms like "or more"
or "at least" have only one plain meaning, this rule is not relevant to their
interpretation.
When a patentee uses phrases like "or more" or "at least" to claim a material
having a property included in an open-ended range bounded on the low end by a
specific number, she is likely using the words according to their widely accepted,
everyday meanings. For example, consider United States Patent 5,281,477, which
is paradigmatic of the type of language this Comment is concerned with. Claim 1
of the '477 Patent reads as follows:
A carbon fiber of a high tenacity and a high modulus of elasticity
which has a fiber diameter of 1 6 microns, a strand tenacity of
503 kg/mm 2 or more, a strand modulus of elasticity of 28 ton/mm
2
or more and a density of 1.773 g/cm 3 or more.74
The '477 Patent's specification does not define the term "or more"; thus, its
ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art controls.7 5 There is no reason to think that
the term "or more" means something different to one skilled in the art of carbon
fiber synthesis than it does to any other person, because the "words themselves"
must have special meaning to a person skilled in the art, 6 rather than the words in
69. Id. at 1314 (quoting Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. DigitalBiometrics, 149 F.3d at 1344.
72. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. For example, in Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc., the patentee claimed
a stringed sports racket having a "pattern of splay" in which "[the offset] distance di varies between
minimum distances for the first and last string ends in [the] sequence and a maximum distance for a
string end between [the] first and last string ends in [the] sequence." 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded
that the plain meaning and prosecution history equally supported two different interpretations of the key
phrase "varies between." See id. at 1579 80. In addition, the specification did not define the term. Id.
at 1579. The accused infringer favored an interpretation that required the offset distance to take on three
or more values-a greater limitation, which would result in a narrower claim-whereas the patentee
argued that only two or more values were needed-a lesser limitation, which would result in a broader
claim. Id. at 1580 81. To decide between the two otherwise equal interpretations, the court chose the
interpretation that would result in a narrower claim, grounding its decision in the "notice" function of
the second paragraph of § 112. See id. at 1581.
74. U.S. Patent No. 5,281,477 col.10 11.41-45 (filed Apr. 9, 1991) (emphasis added).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 66 70.
76. ChefAm., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
It is not enough for a person skilled in the art to realize that the words, taken literally, would result in
something other than the patentee envisioned. Id. (holding that a baker's interpretation of claim words
were irrelevant insofar as he interpreted the claim words in an unusual way "not because the words
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context of the claim. In similar contexts, courts have assigned the usual "dictionary
definition" to such language.77 Most likely, a court would similarly construe the
words "or more" in Claim 1 of the '477 Patent. For example, "a strand tenacity of
503 kg/mm2 or more" probably means exactly what it says: a strand tenacity of at
least 503 kg/mm2.78
A patentee who wishes to avoid a "plain meaning claim construction,
79
therefore, might wish to act as her own lexicographer with respect to open-ended
terms. Such a patentee may do so either explicitly or implicitly;0 but in any case
he must do so "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision"'" and must
"'set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so
as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change" in meaning. 2 It is
unclear, however, what a patentee would gain by redefining open-ended product
claim terms. While special definitions can give the patentee control and certainty
in claim interpretation, why a patentee would not choose different words to achieve
the same purpose without idiosyncratically redefining common, everyday terms
[had] special meaning to him, but because [he knew] that raising the temperature of a dough product
itself to such high temperatures would result in an unusable product" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
77. See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
"at least" means "as the minimum"); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Beautone Specialties Co., 117 F.
Supp. 2d 72, 88 (D. Mass. 1999) (noting that the term "at least" establishes a limitation of "no less
than"); Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (enjoining use of
antibodies having a certain affinity "or higher" where the claims cover antibodies having "at least" a
certain affinity), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Nat'l Research Dev. Corp. v. Great Lakes
Carbon Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1108, 1119 (D. Del. 1975) (equating "at least" to "the minimum value").
For an example of an alternative construction of such language, see J . Eaton & Co. v. At. Paste &
Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1997). InJT. Eaton, the court construedthe phrase "aplastic flow
temperature above 120' F' to mean that "the adhesive must resist flow when exposed for 24 hours to
1200 F in both horizontal and vertical orientations." Id. at 1570 (emphasis added). However, the
patentee suggested this unusual definition during prosecution not because "above 120' F" required
explication but because "plastic flow temperature" had no accepted meaning in the art. Id. at 1566,
1568. The use of "or more" in the '477 Patent is not analogous. In the '477 Patent, the metrics
associated with the open-ended numerical ranges-strand tenacity, modulus of elasticity, and
density all have well-defined meanings in the carbon fiber industry.
78. To some, such a construction of the term "or more" might seem frustrating or circular because
it merely uses a synonym-"at least"-in place of"or more." However, any apparent circularity merely
emphasizes the crux of this Comment's conclusion about open-ended terms such as "or more": They
are common English terms that, barring a patentee's internal lexicography, can only mean one thing.
No matter how much such terms are shaken, stirred, or examined with squinty eyes, they have only one
plain meaning.
79. This Comment uses the term "plain meaning claim construction" to refer to a claim
construction in which open-ended terms are given their plain meaning in ordinary, everyday use.
80. MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2111.01 (IV). Explicit lexicography occurs when the patentee states
specifically what she means when she uses certain words. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,308,496 col.411.21-26
(filed June 7, 2002) ("As used throughout this application, the word 'may' is used in a permissive sense
(i.e., meaning having the potential to), rather than the mandatory sense (i.e., meaning must). Similarly,
the words 'include,' 'including,' and 'includes' mean including, but not limited to."). Implicit
lexicography occurs when the use of the term in context implies a different meaning than the plain
meaning. MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2111.01(IV); see, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term "solder reflow temperature" to mean "peak
reflow temperature, rather than the liquidus temperature," because the only embodiment of the invention
in the specification would fall outside the scope of the claim if the alternative definition were chosen).
81. Inre Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
82. Id. (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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such as "or more" to take on counterintuitive meanings is difficult to see. For
example, if a patentee wished to claim a material having a property of "about" a
certain magnitude, he could simply use that word instead of redefining "at least" to
mean "about."83
A more difficult situation arises when a patentee uses open-ended terms as if
they carried something other than their plain meaning, without explicitly redefining
them. Consider, for instance, United States Patent 7,214,428. Dependent Claims 2,
3, 4, and 5 claim the "functionalized fluorescent nanocrystal probe of claim 1,
wherein said fluorescent nanocrystal emits light with a quantum yield of greater
than about" 10%, 3 0%, 50%, and 70%, respectively.14 If the term "greater than" is
given its ordinary meaning, Claims 3, 4, and 5 are redundant as written, for the sake
of capturing the fluorescent probes of potential infringers.85 Does such use create
an implicit lexicography such that Claim 2 covers quantum yields of 10% to 29%
and Claim 3 covers quantum yields of 30% to 49%, or are all the claims to be
construed broadly? While resolution of this issue is outside the scope of this
Comment, the careful patentee should consider this question before drafting such
a series of claims.
Having addressed the situations in which open-ended claim language is given
its plain meaning and in which the patentee acts as his own lexicographer, this Part
now turns to the third possibility-that the language could be given whatever
meaning is necessary to make the claim valid. Though courts "construe claims, if
possible, so as to sustain their validity, it is well settled that no matter how great the
temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not redraft claims."86 In
addition, the Federal Circuit has disclaimed a broad application of the "maxim that
claims should be construed to preserve their validity" and has refused to "endorse[]
a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction."87
Rather, the court has "limited the maxim to cases in which 'the court concludes,
after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim is still
83. For a discussion of the potential consequences and problems of imprecise claim terms, see
Peter G. Dilworth, About "'About" and Other Imprecise Claim Terms, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 423 (1996), which argues that imprecise terms expand the literal scope of claims, cloud their
exact boundaries, and jeopardize the priority or validity of a patent.
84. U.S. Patent No. 7,214,428 col.21 11.36-47 (filed Apr. 9, 2003).
85. Note that this series of claims does not refer to different kinds or categories ofnanocrystals.
The quantum yield of colloidal semiconductor nanocrystals (also called "quantum dots") is frequently
used as a metric of quality for a given type or category of nanocrystals, not as a way to distinguish
between types or categories of nanocrystals. See John P. Zimmer, Quantum Dot-Based Nanomaterials
for Biological Imaging 23 25 (June 26, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology) (on file with Hayden Library, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
86. Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
However, Stephanie Ann Yonker has noted,
The scope of claim terms is limited where the specification makes clear that the
invention does not include a particular feature, even if the language of the claim
might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.
Accordingly, claims are not properly construed to have a meaning or scope that
would lead to their invalidity for failure to satisfy the requirements of
patentability, i.e. written description or enablement.
Stephanie Ann Yonker, Post-Phillips Claim Construction: Questions Unresolved, 47 IDEA 301, 305
(2007) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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ambiguous."' 88 Open-ended product claims will rarely or never satisfy this residual
ambiguity test because terms like "or more" or "at least" have only one plain
meaning. 9
A court's refusal to narrowly construe an open-ended product claim comports
well with the claim interpretation principles outlined above, especially those that
emphasize the importance of careful language choice. Indeed, as a policy matter,
the onus to draft claims of appropriate-reasonably fair and accurate scope should
rest on the patentee. Based on the foregoing, only a foolish claim drafter would rely
on a court's post facto reigning in of an open-ended product claim.
B. Prosecution: MPEP Guidelines
Part III.A has argued that open-ended terms in product claims in an issued
patent may very well be interpreted according to their plain meaning. Interestingly,
in the context of open-ended terms in product claims, a similar result is mandated
by the MPEP during prosecution. Section 2111 of the MPEP requires examiners to
give claims "their broadest reasonable interpretation" in light of the specification
as read by a person having ordinary skill in the art. 90 As a policy matter, the
broadest reasonable interpretation is chosen to prevent a claim from being
construed too broadly after the patent issues.9 In other words, if the examiner
construes the claim as broadly as he reasonably can and ultimately allows the claim,
then there is no fear that a court or market competitor will read the claim in the
issued patent as covering more ground than the inventor and examiner intended for
the claim to cover. This is because the inventor and examiner chose the broadest
possible reasonable reading in the first place.
Claim construction under section 2111 of the MPEP requires that the words of
a claim be given their plain meaning, unless that plain meaning conflicts with the
specification (e.g., the specification defines the words specially, in accordance with
the patentee's acting as his own lexicographer). 92 Just like in the litigation context,
the plain meaning is what a person having ordinary skill in the art would think the
plain meaning is.93 Further, the MPEP prohibits the importation of limitations from
the specification into the claim terms.94 As a result, "[o]rdinary, simple English
words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable ...are construed to mean
88. Id. (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
89. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
90. MIPEP, supra note 8, at § 2111. The Federal Circuit has recognized this standard for patent
prosecution many times. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("During examination, 'claims ... are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification, and.., claim language should be read in light of the specification as
it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. ' (alterations in original) (quoting In re Bond,
910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).
91. MPEP,supranote 8, at § 2111 (citingIn re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
92. Id. at § 2111.01(1) (citing Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
93. Id. at § 2111.01(111) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc)).
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exactly what they say."95 As an example, section 2111 cites the result in Chef
America, Inc. v. Lamb- Weston, Inc., where the phrase "heating the resulting batter-
coated dough to a temperature in the range of about 400'F to 850'F" was construed
to require heating the dough itself, as opposed to the air inside the oven, to that
temperature.96
As discussed in Part Ill.A above, open-ended terms like "or more" or "at least"
have only one plain meaning their ordinary meaning in everyday English.
Therefore, when these words appear in claims like Claim I of the '477 Patent 7 or
Mary's hypothetical Claim 4,98 they will impart a very broad scope to the claim as
a whole, and an examiner may not read the claim to encompass only the highest
value disclosed in the specification."
Based on the foregoing, an examiner like Alfonso confronted with an open-
ended claim like Mary's Claim 4 will interpret the claim broadly, according to the
everyday meaning of the open-ended terms. The next task for the examiner is to
determine whether the claim so construed is enabled. Part IV of this Comment
addresses the enablement inquiry in the PTO.
IV. THE PTO ENABLEMENT INQUIRY
Section 2164.08 ofthe MPEP, titled "Enablement Commensurate in Scope with
the Claims," addresses scope ofenablement. ° ° Section 2164.08 requires that when
a "reasonable interpretation of the claim is broader than the description in the
specification, [the examiner must] make sure the full scope of the claim is
enabled."' 0 ' Part 11 ofthis Comment argued that open-ended product claims will fall
into this category. °2 To carry out its mandate, section 2164.08 suggests a two-part
inquiry: the examiner must (1) "determine how broad the claim is with respect to
the disclosure" and (2) determine if a person having ordinary skill in the art is able
to practice the full scope of the invention without undue experimentation.0 3 The
second prong of this inquiry essentially restates the basic enablement standard.
10 4
Therefore, section 2164.08 articulates an uncontroversial proposition: examiners
95. Id. at § 2111.01() (citing ChefAm., 358 F.3d at 1371 72).
96. Id. at § 2111.01 (1) (citing ChefAn., 358 F.3d at 1372). To adopt the alternative view that the
phrase should be construed to refer to heating the air inside the oven, rather than the dough, it was not
enough that a person skilled in the art might realize that the words, taken literally, would result in
something other than the patentee envisioned. Chef Am., 358 F.3d at 1375. The Chef America court
ultimately held that a baker's interpretation of claim words was irrelevant insofar as he interpreted the
claim words in an unusual way "not because the words ha[d] special meaning to him, but because [he
knew] that raising the temperature of a dough product itself to such high temperatures would result in
an unusable product." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. U.S. Patent No. 5,281,477 col.10 11.41-45 (filed Apr. 9, 1991).
98. See discussion supra Part 1.
99. See supra text accompanying note 94. For example, ifa patentee claimed "nanocrystals having
a quantum yield of 30% or more" but disclosed no embodiment having a quantum yield greater than
45%, the examiner could not interpret the claim as written to cover nanocrystals with a quantum yield
of 45% but not those with a quantum yield of 90%.
100. MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.08.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
103. MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.08.
104. See discussion supra Part II.
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should first understand what exactly the patentee is claiming and then decide if the
specification enables the claimed matter. This inquiry is one of the fundamental
tasks of the PTO, and the patent system inherently presumes that examiners are
competent to undertake it. °a
In the case of open-ended product claims, however, this Part argues that the
presumption is wrong. Specifically, the presumption fails for two reasons: (1) scope
of enablement tests are highly fact-dependent and leave an enormous amount of
discretion in the hands of the examiner or the court; and (2) even the inventor will
not know for certain what subsequent experimentation will show her method can
in fact achieve. The second reason is especially important. The examiner, like the
inventor and any other person skilled in the art, will likely not have enough
information on which to make anything better than an educated guess about what
the new method can achieve.'0 6 Given that the examiner will have very little time
to devote to the application,0 7 this concern is especially relevant to the validity of
the above presumption.
Part IV.A outlines the tests for scope ofenablement and concludes that they all
do little more than restate the basic inquiry, which results in highly fact-dependent
outcomes, which in turn leaves great discretion in the hands of an examiner or
court. Part IV.B argues that, in the case of open-ended product claims, which are
likely to be construed very broadly, 8 patent examiners are ill-equipped to
undertake such a fact-dependent inquiry. In addition, the policy concerns that
normally require examiners to undertake such fact-specific inquiries actually
militate against the inquiry in the case of open-ended products claims. As an
alternative to the current MPEP approach for open-ended product claims,'0 9 Part
IV.B suggests that patent examiners should presumptively reject open-ended
product claims, instead allowing claims that are limited by the highest values
disclosed in the specification.
A. Tests for Enablement
Despite the ubiquitous citation of the undue experimentation standard, no
universally applicable scope of enablement test exists. Instead, "the factual
diversity of cases involving disclosure issues leads to generalized standards that
must be applied to a wide array of specific technologies. As a result, [factfinders]
have a large amount of discretion in applying the [disparate enablement]
doctrines."''1 Or, put another way, the undue experimentation analysis need not
105. See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposalfor
a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better- Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 1, 18 (2000).
106. Arguably, it is better for the patent system as a whole if the examiner, rather than a
competitor during litigation, is the one to bear the burden of winnowing out overly broad claims. See
Seymore, supra note 13 (manuscript at 31 & n. 147) ("[T]he public need not bear the cost and burden
of litigation to determine if the disclosure adequately enables the claimed invention.").
107. See supra text accompanying notes 5 6.
108. See discussion supra Part III.B.
109. See MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.08.
110. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 852 (1990).
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always be explicitly carried out,"' though it frequently is." 2 Instead, other tests can
be used to answer the same fundamental question. This Part addresses three of the
tests, including the formal undue experimentation test.
In brief, for an open-ended claim to be enabled, one of three tests must be met:
(1) the Wands test, requiring the application of the so-called Wands factors to
ensure that undue experimentation is not needed to practice the full scope of the
claimed invention (the formal undue experimentation standard);" 3 (2) the Scripps
test, requiring that the specified lower limit is close to an inherent upper limit that
a person skilled in the art could obtain based on the specification's teaching;" 4 or
(3) the subset test, requiring that the specification describes and exemplifies a
subset of a larger claimed class, which subset enables the larger class." 5 However,
none of these principles provide much guidance to patentees, examiners, courts, or
market competitors, as this Part will show. Except for certain fact patterns, the
above tests do little more than restate the original enablement question, which is
one reason why factfinders indeed "have a large amount of discretion.' '" 6
1. The Wands Test
As noted in Part 11, the scope of enablement includes both what "is disclosed
in the specification [and] what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art
without undue experimentation."'' 7 "While determining whether [a] required
amount of experimentation is 'undue' is an inherently imprecise undertaking,"' 8
the Federal Circuit has enumerated eight "illustrative" factors (the "Wands factors")
to consider." 9 The Wands factors include the following:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of
the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
111. An explicit application of the undue experimentation analysis is one in which the so-called
Wands factors are specifically listed and applied. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
112. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
113. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
114. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
115. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
116. Merges & Nelson, supra note 110, at 852.
117. Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc., v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); see also In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Although the statute does not say
so, enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention
without 'undue experimentation."' (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). Despite
the doctrine's entrenchment in patent law, imputing the fruits of future experimentation to a patentee's
present disclosure is a common law creation. The Supreme Court first articulated the idea in Minerals
Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916). See generally Mark H. Hopkins, Comment, Has
the Reasonable Experimentation Doctrine Become Unreasonable?": Rethinking the Reasonable
Experimentation Doctrine in Light of Automated Experimental Techniques, 2 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 116, 122-24 (2002) (tracing the common law evolution of the doctrine).
118. Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc., 413 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
119. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. Though called the Wands factors, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the PTO Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences first articulated these factors in In re
Colianni, 561 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and Exparte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1986), respectively.
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predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of
the claims. 20
Not all of these factors weigh heavily in the typical Wands analysis.12' For
example, the state of the prior art has rarely been identified as a key factor. 2 2 For
purposes of open-ended product claims in the unpredictable arts, this Comment
suggests that the most important factors are probably the breadth of the claims, the
quantity of experimentation necessary, the relative skill of those in the art, and the
unpredictability of the art. The breadth of the claims refers to claim construction.'23
As noted above in Part 111, open-ended claims will typically be construed very
broadly,'24 which favors a finding of undue experimentation.'25 The touchstone for
the amount of experimentation is not the amount so much as the type: as long as the
required experimentation is routine, the amount can be considerable without a
finding of undue experimentation.'26 In addition, the higher the relative skill of
those in the art, the greater the amount of experimentation that may be permissible
without a finding of undue experimentation. 21 Conversely, chemistry's
unpredictability requires a higher showing of enablement to obtain the same scope
of claim protection vis a vis predictable arts.
128
Despite its frequent employment, commentators have criticized the Wands test
as unhelpful. One commentator noted, "While the scope ofenablement theoretically
varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability, the Wands test failed to
enumerate specific criteria for determining adequate disclosure in the unpredictable
arts. This inadequacy resulted in the granting of overbroad patents in unpredictable
fields, like [chemistry]."' 29 Another scholar attacked the Wands test as ambiguous,
and its factors as duplicative and confusingly interdependent. 3 '
These critiques should come as no surprise. The Wands factors are
multitudinous, broadly worded,'' and partially dependent on hindsight analysis.1
3 2
120. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
121. See Hopkins, supra note 117, at 125.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See discussion supra Part III.B.
125. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
the patentee's broadly construed claim of a device that behaved as a transistor "at all times" was not
enabled because the invented device behaved as a transistor under only some operating conditions).
126. Exparte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1982).
127. Hopkins, supra note 117, at 126.
128. Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1096, 1107-08 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
("Patents concerning chemical reactions ... generally involve unpredictable factors and thus enable a
narrower range of claims [than patents concerning more predictable arts]." (citing In re Fisher, 427 F.2d
833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970))), aff'd in part, vacated inpart, and remanded, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
129. Corrin Nicole Drakulich, Note, University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.: In Search of
a Written Description Standard, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 11, 17 (2006).
130. See Hopkins, supra note 117, at 130.
131. For example, the "nature" of the invention, the "state" of the prior art, and the "relative skill"
of practitioners can each be articulated in many different ways, depending on the whim of the person
conducting the analysis.
132. How can one know a priori the "quantity of experimentation necessary" to practice the full
scope of the claimed invention'? The only accurate way to determine this quantity is to ask afterwards
how much experimentation competitors in fact needed.
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As a result, patentees, examiners, and market competitors on the front end are left
to guess how a court will conduct the analysis later. In other words, confronted with
the "undue experimentation" standard and the malleable Wands factors, an
interested party is left with little guidance-but great discretion-as he asks the
original enablement question about an open-ended product claim: Given that this
patent claims more than it literally discloses, how do I decide whether the narrower
disclosure enables the broader claims? Or, to what protection is the patentee
entitled?.33
2. The Scripps Test
Like the undue experimentation standard, the second test was also introduced
in Part 11. The Fisher court suggested that one reason the inventor's open-ended
claim was not enabled was because there was no "inherent upper limit" to the
theoretically possible potencies of ACTH compositions like those claimed.'34 The
court cited three cases involving claims of pure or uncontaminated substances. 3 '
Those cases disclosed "pure" aspirin,"' an L-lactone "substantially free from" the
presence of the undesired D-lactone,' 37 and a substance "practically free from"
certain impurities.'38 Compared to the 100% maximum inherent in all purities, the
Fisher court stated that these disclosed purities left a "possible range of further
purification [that] was either small or nonexistent."' 39 By contrast, the invention in
Fisher was not bounded by an inherent upper limit analogous to 100% purity,
removing it from the rules of those cases. 4
The Federal Circuit rearticulated this test twenty-one years later in Scripps
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. 1 : "Open-ended claims .... may
be supported if [ 1] there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and
[2] the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit."'42 In
Scripps, the patentees claimed a process for purifying human Factor VIII:C-a
naturally occurring protein important for blood clotting.'43 They also claimed
human VIII:C preparations "substantially free" of a certain impurity.'44 The
133. It is important to remember that the scope of enablement inquiry is ultimately about fairness
not only to the patentee, but also to the rest of society, including her competitors. Judicial enablement
doctrines should be evaluated with this principle in mind.
134. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839-40 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
135. See id. (citing Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912); In re
Williams, 171 F.2d 319 (C.C.P.A. 1948); Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887
(N.D. Ill. 1909), aff'd, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910)).
136. See Farbenfabriken, 171 F. at 888.
137. See Williams, 171 F.2d at 319.
138. See Parke-Davis, 196 F. at 497.
139. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839.
140. Id. at 839-40.
141. 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
142. Id. at 1572. This Comment refers to this test as the "Scripps test," rather than the "Fisher
test" or some other moniker, for two reasons. First, the author likes the way the Scripps court phrased
the test. Second, the Federal Circuit recently cited Scripps, not Fisher, for this principle. See Andersen
Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1376 77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, as noted the
Scripps court rearticulated a principle first set forth in Fisher.
143. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1568.
144. 1d. at 1570.
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inventors in Scripps tried to distinguish their product claims from those in Fisher
by saying, essentially, that the Scripps claims were not open-ended. 45 The court did
not address this issue, however, remanding on other grounds.
14 6
Applying the Scripps test, the Federal Circuit in Andersen Corp. v. Fiber
Composites, LLC 147 recently upheld ajury's determination that a patentee's claims
were enabled, where the open-ended claims required a wood-polymer composite
fiber having a "Young's modulus rating of greater than 500,000.,, 148 The novelty
of the invention in Andersen lay in the fiber's physical properties. 49 Importantly,
the specification disclosed a Young's modulus rating well above the specified lower
limit: "greaterthan 500,000" claimed and up to 1.2 million disclosed. 150 Further, the
Federal Circuit cited an expert's testimony regarding the range of possible values
for the Young's modulus of such a fiber as that claimed:
[A] person of skill in the art would recognize that the upper limit
of the Young's modulus of the [fiber] would lie somewhere
between the Young's modulus of the wood fiber and that of the
polymer used in the composition, and that a person of skill in the




The result in Andersen 52 suggests that the Scripps test requires that the inherent
upper limit be known to some degree of precision.
Even where the first element of the Scripps test is satisfied, the specification
must be scrutinized for actual enablement. Six days before it decided Scripps, the
Federal Circuit held an open-ended claim invalid for lack ofenablement inAmgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 15 3 InAmgen, the patent in suit claimed a purified
protein having a "specific activity of at least 160,000 IU per absorbance unit at 280
nanometers.' 54 The district court upheld the claim but the Federal Circuit
reversed.155 Even though there was an inherent upper limit corresponding to a
protein of 100% purity, the Federal Circuit reversed because the patentee's
procedure for measuring the specific activity did "not establish ... a workable
method for actually obtaining the pure material that it claimed."', 56 The accused
145. See id. at 1572.
146. See id at 1574.
147. 474F.3d 1361.
148. Id. at 1376.
149. Id. at 1372.
150. Id. at 1376.
151. Id. at 1377.
152. Though the court deemed the open-ended claim inAndersen to be enabled, the presumption
of validity favored such a result because the patent had already issued. See Andersen, 474 F.3d at 1376
("Fiber's arguments fall short of satisfying the heavy burden required to overturn the jury's verdict.").
Generally, a factfinder could weigh the presumption of validity for issued claims more or less heavily.
153. See 927 F.2d 1200, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
154. Id. at 1203.
155. Id. at 1203, 1216.
156. Id. at 1216.
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infringer won its argument that specific activities within the open-ended range (e.g.,
190,000 IU/AU) should not be protected.'57
The shortcoming of the Scripps test is simply that it is a positive test: it defines
one situation in which an open-ended claim may be enabled. It says nothing
definitive about whether an open-ended claim that does not involve a relatively near
inherent upper limit could be enabled. For that matter, it says nothing about how
close to the highest disclosed value the inherent upper limit need be to trigger the
second part of the Scripps inquiry." 8 In addition, when that second inquiry does
occur, an interested party is left in essentially the same position he was in before
coming to the Scripps test for guidance: he must look at what is disclosed, look at
the theoretical upper limit which was not disclosed, and decide whether enablement
of the former convinces him that the latter has been enabled too.
3. The Subset Test
Where a patent claims a broad class but the specification describes and
exemplifies only a subset of the larger claimed class, the patent's broad claims are
invalid unless achievement of the subset enables the larger class as well. This test
is especially pertinent where the invention concerns an unpredictable art like
chemistry. This proposition can be gleaned from In re Fisher,'59 In re Vaeck, 160 and
Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp.'
In Fisher, the court rejected a claim of a polypeptide having "at least 24 amino
acids" where "the specification [did] not enable one skilled in the art to make or
obtain [polypeptides] with other than 39 amino acids."' 6 2 Similarly, the Federal
Circuit in Vaeck upheld a rejection for lack of enablement of a claim that claimed
all types of cyanobacteria, where cyanobacteria were incompletely understood and
included "150 different genera," and where only one strain of cyanobacteria was
disclosed.'63 Likewise, the Federal Circuit in Harris held that the patentee
"predicted-rather than invented" a device that behaved as a transistor "at all
times," because the invented device behaved as a transistor under some operating
conditions;"' in other words, the patentee invented a device that behaved as a
transistor at almost all times. In all three of these cases, the patentee disclosed and
exemplified one portion of a larger class, but claimed the entire class. And in each
case the court concluded that the disclosure of the subset did not enable the larger
class.
To see how this proposition relates to open-ended product claims, consider
once again the '477 Patent. 6 5 Like the patents at issue in Fisher and Vaeck, the
157. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1795 (D. Mass. 1989), aJf'd in part,
rev'd in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d at 1216.
158. Perhaps as other courts cite Scripps and apply its test, it will become clearer how close as
a percentage perhaps-the inherent upper limit need be.
159. 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
160. 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
161. 114F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
162. 427 F.2d at 836.
163. 947 F.2d at 489, 495.
164. 114F.3dat 1156.
165. U.S. Patent No. 5,281,477 col. 10 11.4145 (filed Apr. 9, 1991).
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'477 Patent claims a broad class of materials in an unpredictable art.'66 Also like the
Fisher and Vaeck patents, the '477 specification probably enables only a subset of
the broad class. 167 Teaching how to obtain the subset of carbon fibers having, for
example, a strand tenacity of approximately 565 kg/mm2-probably roughly what
the '477 Patent actually enables-or less is not the same as teaching how to make
carbon fibers having a strand tenacity of 700 kg/mm2 . Put another way, the
specification simply does not teach one skilled in the art how to do all that the
patent claims. Therefore, the '477 Patent's achievement of the subclass does not
also enable the larger class. Accordingly, under Fisher, Vaeck, and Harris, the '477
Patent's claims are probably not enabled.
Like the Scripps test, the subset test does little more than restate the basic
enablement inquiry. The subset test essentially asks if the disclosure, enabling for
a subset of the claimed materials, truly enables all the other claimed materials that
are not apparently enabled on the face of the specification for which there is no
proof of enablement. In addition, the subset test applies more squarely to broad
claims like those in Vaeck than it does to open-ended product claims like Mary's
hypothetical Claim 4 or Claim I of the '477 Patent. Thus, the outcomes of cases
like Vaeck offer little guidance for the analysis of typical open-ended product
claims.
161
Before concluding this Part, this Comment must briefly address another line of
cases. Some patentees, improperly relying on a series of post-Fisher cases, errantly
judge the enablement of a claim based on technology in existence at a time other
than the time of filing.'69 After Fisher, the Federal Circuit's predecessor court
vacated a rejection of broad polymer claims under § 112 on the grounds that a later
state of the art cannot be used to invalidate a claim as not enabled when filed.
170
The patentee in In re Hogan claimed a solid polymer of propylene having certain
properties.'' Because the claim did not specify the polymer's crystallinity, it
captured both the crystalline and amorphous forms, though the specification taught
only how to obtain the crystalline form. 172 At the time of filing, however, no one
166. See id. For these purposes, consider the universe of all possible carbon fibers as the "larger
class" and any set of carbon fibers not containing all possible carbon fibers as the "subset" of the larger
class. While such a definition of classes is unlike that usually seen in cases invoking this enablement
test, see, e.g., Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 490, 495 (involving different genera of cyanobacteria), the idea is the
same.
167. This conclusion is, of course, a legal one and, moreover, is uncertain for all the reasons
outlined in this Part. Nevertheless, the conclusion is as certain as any could be in this uncertain field due
to the '477 Patent's particularly weak specification. Though expert testimony would be needed to
establish the issue, it is likely that the highest values achievable by the '477 Patent's teaching in 1991
are far below those achievable by other methods today. Accordingly, today's improved carbon fibers
are not enabled by the '477 Patent, yet are part of the very broad class of fibers that the patent claims.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 12 16.
169. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339-42 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (analyzing this line of cases superbly).
170. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Among Hogan's progeny are the
following: United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1249, 1251 (Fed. Cir.
1989); and Hormone Research Foundation, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 69 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
171. 559 F.2d at 597-98.
172. See id. at 601.
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knew that the amorphous form could be obtained at all.' 73 That the Hogan
specification did not enable the full scope of the claim only became apparent years
later, after the state of the art had changed.'74 The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held simply that the later state of the art could not be used to "'reach back'
and preclude or invalidate a patent on the underlying invention."'75 In other words,
the state of the art at the time of filing, not a later state of the art, must indicate that
the full scope of the claims is enabled.' 76
Because the enablement rejection in Hogan was based on a "post-filing date
state of the art,"' 77 courts will usually "not [be required to] consider the effect of
Hogan and its progeny on Fisher's analysis of when an inventor should be allowed
to 'dominate the future patentable inventions of others."" 78 The Federal Circuit
later stated, "We do not read Hogan as allowing an inventor to claim what was
specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed,
unless the patent discloses how to make and use it." '179 Therefore, a later
development cannot save a nonenabled claim. That is, a claim like Mary's Claim
4, if not enabled at the time of filing, is not made valid by a subsequent
breakthrough in Mary's laboratory or elsewhere.
In sum, this Part suggests that the three standard tests for scope of
enablement the Wands test, the Scripps test, and the subset test do not provide
much additional guidance for the analysis of open-ended claims. Rather, they all
essentially restate the basic enablement inquiry in a way that may not be very
helpful for an examiner like Alfonso. However, on its own, this observation
signifies little. After all, the task of the PTO is to engage in highly fact-specific
investigations for the sake of judging whether the statutory requirements of
patentability, including enablement, have been satisfied by a particular applicant.
While the unhelpfulness of available tests might make this task more difficult in the
case of open-ended product claims, the job can theoretically still be done. Thus, the
critical question becomes why the patent system should make an exception to its
normal operating assumptions and procedures in the case of open-ended product
claims. In other words, might the system be better served if the ordinary
presumption of examiner competency to filter out unworthy claims were suspended
in this limited context? Or, put another way, should the PTO promulgate a new
guideline categorically barring open-ended product claims? Part IV.B answers this
question in the affirmative.
173. Id. at 605.
174. See id at 606.
175. Id.
176. The Federal Circuit commented on this issue in 2003 by stating,
In both Hogan and Hormone Research, which relied on Hogan, compounds
having better qualities did not seem to be in existence on the date when the patent
applications were filed, but the claims (albeit with a narrower scope) might be
nevertheless enabled in view of the state of the art then existing.
Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
177. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 n.22 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605-07).
178. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 495 n.22 (quoting In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
179. Plant Genetic Sys., 315 F.3d at 1340.
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B. An Alternative Approach
It is important to remember that open-ended product claims are very broad
claims, in some cases stretching literally into infinity."8 ° Due largely to this
exceptional breadth, this Part argues that patent examiners are ill-equipped to
undertake such a fact-dependent inquiry as is required to determine enablement of
such claims. In addition, the policy concerns that normally require examiners to
undertake such fact-specific inquiries in fact militate against the inquiry in the case
of open-ended products claims. As an alternative to the current MPEP approach for
open-ended product claims, 8' this Part suggests that patent examiners should
presumptively reject open-ended product claims, allowing only those claims that
are limited by the highest values actually achieved by the patentee and disclosed in
the specification. Patentees may not like this suggested alternative approach
because they would no longer have the option of seeking the very broad right to
exclude granted by open-ended product claims. Nevertheless, as Part IV.B.2 argues,
the patent system as a whole would be better served by adoption of this Comment's
suggested approach.
1. Examiner Competency
While it is true that the "patent system is premised on the belief that Patent
Examiners will do a competentjob of winnowing out subpatentable inventions most
of the time,"'82 this Comment suggests that the breadth of open-ended product
claims weakens this presumption, at least in this limited context. The problem is
two-fold. First, open-ended product claims extend into the future in a way that most
other claims do not. Second, even the inventor, who is presumably among the
world's leading authorities on her invention, cannot be certain at the time of filing
whether her new process will allow her or others to realize products having
properties far superior to the best she has been able to produce to date.
Imagine, for example, that an inventor has achieved a major breakthrough in
semiconductor nanocrystal synthesis, developing a method for producing gallium
arsenide nanocrystals with a quantum yield of up to 30%. Assume the previous best
was 5%. The inventor seeks to patent not only the new method, but also the
nanocrystals themselves made by her method or any other method. She drafts an
open-ended product claim to cover any gallium arsenide nanocrystals having a
quantum yield of at least 25%. This claim, if allowed, would bar others from
making gallium arsenide nanocrystals having a quantum yield of 90%, even if they
made them some other way. 183 Moreover, it might take other chemists a decade or
180. See discussion supra Part 11.
181. See MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.08.
182. Bartow, supra note 105, at 18.
183. A stymied competitor could of course challenge the validity of the claim in litigation.
However, it is arguably better for the patent system as a whole if the examiner is the one to bear the
burden of winnowing out overly broad claims, rather than a competitor during litigation. See Seymore,
supra note 13 (manuscript at 31 & n. 147) ("[T]he public need not bear the cost and burden of litigation
to determine if the disclosure adequately enables the claimed invention."). In addition, the mere
existence of the issued patent, which is presumed valid during litigation, see supra note 20, could chill
a competitor's efforts, see discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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more to figure out how to reach 90%. Not only that, but it might also take the
patentee herself many years of experimentation based on her new method to reach
a quantum yield of 90% if her method is capable of producing such nanocrystals
at all. Alternatively, it might take the patentee only a few months to reach 90%. Or,
no one may ever achieve a quantum yield of 90% by any method. The problem is
that neither the patentee nor her competitors nor a patent examiner can possibly
know a priori which contingency will in fact occur.
Despite the murkiness of gallium arsenide nanocrystal research's future, the
hypothesized open-ended product claim would extend deeply into it. This scenario,
easily imagined for many open-ended product claims in the unpredictable arts,
suggests that no patent examiner, regardless of his level of training, experience, or
intelligence, is competent to make a presumptively valid judgment. Rather, he
could make a guess. The patent system ought not to be premised on guesses.'84
2. Policy Concerns
The patent system's mission is spelled out in the same constitutional provision
that authorizes Congress to legislate in the area: the so-called Intellectual Property
Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."185 Because the patent system's
purpose is to promote progress, it is always appropriate to ask whether a given
statute, common law rule, or administrative guideline does in fact encourage
innovation. If it does not, then legislative, judicial, or administrative change might
be in order.
Granting an overbroad patent means overcompensating an inventor for her
contribution to the progress of science and the useful arts.'86 Not only does an
184. This Comment argues that examiners are not generally competent to accurately judge the
enablement of open-ended product claims, yet current law assumes that they are. See Bartow, supra
note 105, at 18. To gauge the severity of the resulting problem, it would be useful to collect statistics
on how many open-ended product claims get through the PTO and end up in issued patents; how many
get rejected during prosecution; and how many of the allowed claims have been shown to be not
enabled, either directly through subsequent litigation or indirectly through the issuance of later patents
that literally infringe the first patent. However, this latter, indirect measure may be difficult to interpret.
Later-infringing patents could also be issued because the original patent was not found or considered
during prosecution. Therefore, it might be more revealing to limit this metric to only those later-
infringing patents that reference the original. Such a search is beyond the scope of this Comment,
however, and would address only the severity, not the existence, of the problem of open-ended product
claims in the unpredictable arts. Patents like those cited in note 3 supra show that the problem exists.
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
186. Many scholars have debated whether stronger patent protection or weaker patent protection
better encourages innovation. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 253 (1994) ("[O]verly broad patent protection can inhibit future innovation.");
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977)
("The patent system achieves [efficiency] by awarding exclusive and publicly recorded ownership of
[a particular opportunity to develop a known technological possibility] shortly after its discovery.");
Merges & Nelson, supra note 110 (analyzing the economic effects ofpatent scope). More precisely, the
debate centers on ascertaining the "economically optimal balance between innovation today and
innovation tomorrow." Dam, supra, at 253. For a more recent discussion of various scholars' attempts
to articulate the ideal scope of patent protection from an economic point of view, see Sami J. Valkonen
& Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model for the Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright
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overbroad patent enrich its owner unjustly, but it also blocks further progress in the
field. In fact, according to a seminal study, "increases in [patent] scope have greater
preclusive effect than increases in [patent] length."' 87
Due to their exceptional breadth-potentially extending into infinity-this
Comment argues that open-ended product claims are inherently overbroad.
Therefore, the presumed validity of issued claims, which is based on the assumption
that examiners are competent, 8 ' militates against allowing open-ended product
claims. Notwithstanding the presumption of validity, patents may issue that are
invalid. 8 9 To overcome the presumption during litigation, a patent's invalidity must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 190 This barrier, already formidable, can
be "prohibitively" high due to judges' reluctance to "second-guess"
examiners-whose technical expertise far surpasses that of the bench. 9 ' As a result,
the harm of erroneously allowing an open-ended product claim is particularly high.
Not only does its exceptional breadth generate exceptional preclusive effect on
competitors, but the technical difficulty ofj udging its enablement also reduces the
likelihood that an error in its allowance will be corrected in litigation. 92 Indeed,
competitors (or accused infringers) may very well choose to license the technology
(or otherwise settle with the patentee) rather than engage in expensive, time-
consuming, and uncertain litigation.
In sum, open-ended product claims in issued patents may retard innovation in
two ways. First, their exceptional breadth may exert an exceptionally preclusive
effect on the innovation of competitors. This preclusive effect is felt whether
allowing the claims is erroneous or not whether or not the specification "really"
enables them. Second, the technical difficulty of judging the enablement of open-
ended product claims may make mounting a successful challenge against an issued
claim extremely difficult. This Comment argues that, as a policy matter, the
foregoing harms outweigh the primary benefit of allowing open-ended
claims-namely encouraging early disclosure by the first inventor by maximizing
her monopoly.
In light of both the gravity of the harm and the reduced competency of
examiners to accurately gauge the enablement of open-ended product claims,' 93 this
Comment recommends a cautious approach. As an alternative to the current MPEP
Properti ation. An Argument in Support of the Orphan Works Act, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
359, 378 82 (2007) ("[Previous] articles and models ... do not present a cohesive framework
sufficiently simple for the legal community or the legislature to use as a practical analytical tool for the
evaluation of policy decisions."). This Comment does not attempt to summarize the debate. Rather, it
will be taken as a starting premise that overly broad claims discourage total innovation over time,
including innovation "today" and "tomorrow."
187. Merges & Nelson, supra note 110, at 869 n.128 (citing Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro,
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990)).
188. See Bartow, supra note 105, at 18.
189. One court noted that the presumption of validity "does not automatically foreclose thought
and analysis." Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1970).
190. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
191. Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "'Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1176 (1995).
192. See id
193. See Cohen, supra note 191, at 1176 ("[T]he presumption of validity is justified only if the
examiner's qualifications warrant it.").
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guidelines for open-ended product claims,'94 patent examiners should presumptively
reject open-ended product claims and allow only those claims that are limited by
the highest values actually achieved by the patentee and disclosed in the
specification. For example, consider again the gallium arsenide nanocrystal
inventor from Part IV.B. 1. The examiner should reject her "at least 25%" claim, but
could allow a claim limited to quantum yields "between 5% and 30%," or perhaps
"up to 30%."
Though section 2164.08 contains language from In re Goffe'95 seemingly
counseling against such an approach,'96 that case is distinguishable, and the
approach this Comment recommends does not undermine the policy concern Goffe
raises. In Goffe, the examiner rejected numerous process claims on scope of
enablement grounds.'97 The claims called for an "agglomerable" material
generically, and the specification did not "adequately instruct one skilled in the art
how to determine the scope of materials which may be capable of producing the
desired effect (agglomerate) under the conditions of the claimed method."'98
Reversing the decision of the PTO Board of Appeals to uphold the rejection, the
Federal Circuit's predecessor court stated the following:
For all practical purposes, the board would limit [the
applicant] to claims involving the specific materials disclosed in
the examples, so that a competitor seeking to avoid infringing the
claims would merely have to follow the disclosure in the
subsequently-issued patent to find a substitute. However, to
provide effective incentives, claims must adequately protect
inventors. To demand that the first to disclose shall limit his
claims to what he has found will work or to materials which meet
the guidelines specified for "preferred" materials in a process
such as the one herein involved would not serve the constitutional
purpose of promoting progress in the useful arts.'99
Despite this strong language, Goffe is distinguishable because the broad term in
Goffe ("agglomerable") concerned a required characteristic of a functional material
used in a claimed process. In contrast, the "open-ended-ness" of open-ended terms
in product claims is not necessary for a claimed process to work. In addition, the
incentivization policy cited in Goffe is not offended by disallowing open-ended
product claims, because the inventor is adequately protected by her remaining
process claims. 20 0 In other words, this Comment's suggested approach does not
punish an inventor whose new process really does enable the full range of possible
products, because such an inventor's process claims will protect her process, and
194. See MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.08.
195. 542 F.2d 564 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
196. See MPEP, supra note 8, at § 2164.08.
197. 542 F.2d at 565.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 567.
200. This Comment has assumed throughout that open-ended product claims will always be
accompanied by process claims. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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thus her economic interest, even though her product claims, no longer allowed to
be open-ended, will not.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, this Comment argues that the PTO should consider changing its
approach to open-ended product claims. Claim construction principles in both
litigation and prosecution contexts demand that open-ended terms in product claims
be given their plain meaning in virtually all cases. As a result, the scope of open-
ended product claims will typically be quite broad. This exceptional breadth
weakens the presumption that patent examiners are competent to judge whether
open-ended product claims are truly enabled. Moreover, prudent policy, for the
sake of the patent system as a whole, suggests that in this context the PTO err on
the side of allowing narrower claims rather than broader ones. Therefore, as an
alternative to the current MPEP approach for open-ended product claims, this
Comment suggests that patent examiners should presumptively reject open-ended
product claims, instead allowing claims that are limited by the highest values
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